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PROPERTIZING FAIR USE
Abraham Bell* and Gideon Parchomovsky**
In its current form, fair use doctrine provides a personal defense that
applies narrowly to the specific use by the specific user. The recently
issued Supreme Court ruling in the landmark case of Google v. Oracle
illustrates why this is problematic. While the Court ruled that Google’s
use of Oracle’s Java API packages was fair, the ruling does not protect
the numerous parties that developed Java applications for the Android
operating system; it shelters only Google and Google’s particular use.
This is not an isolated problem; the per use/per user rule cuts across
fair uses of copyrighted works, and it always leaves follow-on users in
the cold. Authors, musicians, documentary filmmakers and media
outlets who win fair use cases cannot freely market their works that
incorporate fair use content, since their victories do not carry over to
other users. Fair use under extant law is a very limited privilege.
This Article proposes a far-reaching reform not only of copyright law
as applied to software, but of the fair use doctrine itself. Our proposal
consists of three interlocking elements. First, we call for the
introduction of a new in rem conception of fair use, under which a fair
use ruling would serve as a property remedy that shelters all
subsequent users of works who fairly incorporate preexisting materials.
Under this new conception, a finding of fair use would run with that
new work, like an easement to all other distributors, broadcasters,
publishers, performers and others who use it. The introduction of this
new type of in rem fair use would result in the division of fair use into
two conceptions—one in rem and one in personam—that would co-exist
alongside one another. Second, we would grant judges discretion to
decide which fair use conception, if any, should be granted in any
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particular case. Judges would be able to employ the traditional in
personam rule, allowing fair use to avail only the specific defendant
before it, or they could adopt an in rem fair use ruling, creating a
property entitlement that runs with the work embodying the fairly
incorporated content. Third, we propose two default rules to assist
judges in making their decisions. Specifically, we propose that the
default setting of fair use would depend on the type of use being
examined. Where the claimed fair use consists of incorporating the
protected copyrighted material in a new copyrighted work—such as the
Android operating system—the default fair use would be of the in rem
variety. However, in all other cases of claimed fair use, the traditional,
familiar in personam conception would be the default setting. This
approach would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair uses,
but permit judges to tailor their rulings case by case.
Implementation of our proposal would yield several significant
improvements to the current fair use doctrine. It would permit judges
to take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work,
without handcuffing them to a single approach. Moreover, it would
increase certainty with respect to the use of copyrighted work by
lowering transaction and litigation costs for creators of new works.
Finally, the version of fair use we advocate would enhance the use of
copyrighted content.
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INTRODUCTION
Fair use is one of the most celebrated doctrines in the law.1 It is widely
seen as a key component of the law of copyright, balancing the exclusive
rights of copyright owners with the public interest in the use and
enjoyment of works after their creation.2 It is not only the most significant
and most capacious defense against copyright infringement;3 it is also,

1

See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1601 (1982)
(unearthing the “structural and economic” considerations in fair use); Wendy J. Gordon &
Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared
Use” Fallacy, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 619, 620 (arguing for the continued use of fair use, in light
of its critics); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1659, 1661 (1988) (criticizing fair use and suggesting reforms); Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. Penn. L. Rev. 549 (2008)
(measuring outcomes of fair use cases historically); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair
Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537 (2009) (suggesting a typology of fair use cases based on their
policy implications); Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 815
(2015) (predicting that fair use will survive in spite of critiques and continue to evolve);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004) (separating out fair use claims from free speech
claims); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087 (2007) (proposing reforms
to fair use in light of its alleged abuses); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St. L.J.
47 (2011) (using empirical methodology to argue that fair use outcomes are more consistent
and predictable than they might otherwise be assumed); Jeanne C. Fromer, Market Effects
Bearing on Fair Use, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 615 (2015) (exploring the harms and benefits of fair
use on markets); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use,
83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1051, 1053 (2016) [hereinafter The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use] (“Fair
use is a keystone of the law of copyright . . . .”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110 (1990) (“[T]he function of fair use [is] integral to copyright’s
objectives . . . .”).
2
Stephen McIntyre, Private Rights and Public Wrongs: Fair Use as a Remedy for Private
Censorship, 48 Gonz. L. Rev. 61, 64 (2012) (“The ‘fair use’ doctrine . . . balances copyright
holders’ rights against the public’s interests in free speech and the dissemination of
knowledge, information, and culture.”); Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying
Fair Use, 59 Ariz. L. Rev. 161, 199 (2017) (“Fair use was first crafted as a legal
standard . . . intending to allow courts to reconcile the copyright of authors with the public
interest.”).
3
See The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use, supra note 1, at 1053 (“The fair use defense to
copyright infringement is perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated defense in the law
of intellectual property.”); Carroll, supra note 1, at 1089 (“Fair use is the first and most general
of these limitations.”). Unlike other defenses that apply to infringements of specific rights,
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according to the Supreme Court, an indispensable part of the
constitutional balance between freedom of speech and protected
copyrighted expression.4 Unsurprisingly, the fair use doctrine has
attracted considerable academic attention and has been the subject of
discussion and debate.5 Yet a critical aspect of the doctrine, which goes
to the core of the fair use doctrine, has not been analyzed to date.
There is a sharp asymmetry between the design of the exclusive rights
granted to authors under the Copyright Act and the design of the fair use
defense intended to protect user interests. The asymmetry is found in
copyright’s protection of works, as opposed to fair use’s protection of
uses. Copyright protects a list of rights in a particular work allocated to
the owner of the copyright,6 whereas the fair use defense only pertains to
a specific use by a particular user.7 Put differently, fair use is an agentspecific defense that is analyzed on a use-by-use basis. The fair use
defense does not and cannot offer prophylactic immunity for using the
work; it does not carry over to similar uses by the same user or identical
uses by other users. As a result, the doctrine of fair use is far narrower
than is generally appreciated.
To see why this is a problem, consider the Supreme Court’s recent
ruling in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.8 The case concerned
Google’s copying of thirty-seven packages, comprising roughly 11,500
lines of code, in Java’s Application Programming Interface for use in the

such as reproduction, public performance, and public display, fair use offers protection against
all violations of all rights.
4
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20
(2003) (describing fair use as a “built-in First Amendment accommodation[]”); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“In view of the First
Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship
and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine
of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.”).
5
See generally sources supra note 1 (delineating several aspects of fair use discussion).
6
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .”), with 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2018) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).
7
Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347, 362
(2005) (“In most fair use cases, the identity of the user is known, the use has already been
made, and the only question is whether or not it passes muster.”).
8
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
For an important analysis of the Oracle v. Google litigation prior to the Supreme Court’s
ruling, see generally Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1515 (2016).
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programs used by Android phones.9 (Application Programming
Interfaces, or APIs, can be defined for simplicity’s sake as code orders
that enable interfaces between programs.)10 Oracle claimed that Google
violated its copyright in the API and the Java commands contained
therein.11 In its defense, Google claimed that the commands were
insufficiently original to warrant copyright protection,12 and that even if
the commands were sufficiently original, other doctrines blocked
copyright protection.13 The trial court held for Google, finding that the
commands were insufficiently original and generally outside of copyright
protection.14 However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
determining that Java’s API is copyrighted, and remanded the case to the
trial court for examination of Google’s fair use defense.15 Back in the trial
court, Google claimed that its use of the Java commands in the
programming language for Android phones was a fair use,16 and again
Google won at the trial level.17 Once more, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the jury decision and ordered the trial court to proceed
to the remedies phase.18 Before the trial court could take up the question
of remedies, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision. The Supreme Court held that
Google’s copying of the API was a protected fair use, while assuming
arguendo that the API was copyrightable.19
In ruling that Google’s copying of thirty-seven Java packages from
Oracle’s API was a fair use, the Court cleared the way for Google to
continue using the copied Oracle software. However, the Court did not
consider whether programmers for Android phones could use Google’s
software, even though such programmers would thereby necessarily copy,

9

Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1204.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Operating
systems also function as platforms for software applications. They do this by
‘exposing’ . . . routines or protocols that perform certain widely-used functions. These are
known as Application Programming Interfaces, or ‘APIs.’”).
11
Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1194.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1194–95.
16
Id. at 1195.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1186.
10
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in part, Oracle’s software.20 Importantly, as the Court noted, all fair use
rulings are case by case.21 Other companies that duplicated part of the
thirty-seven packages that Google had copied in order to program for the
Android phone could not be sure that their use of the Java commands
would be considered a fair use. The fair use approved by the Supreme
Court is Google’s use, not that of any other user. Indeed, even Google
could not be sure that any future Google use of Oracle’s API would be
permitted. Google can only be confident that the particular uses
considered in the case were fair uses; any other use of the Java commands
in a different program or use of different commands in the Java API in
the same program would potentially be vulnerable to an infringement suit.
A similar problem arises in other contexts, from music to literature. 2
Live Crew famously won a Supreme Court victory in Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc. on a claim of fair use, allowing it to continue to use
portions of the melody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh Pretty Woman” in its
parody “Pretty Woman.”22 However, a different user who wishes to use 2
Live Crew’s song in another context—for example, by incorporating it as
background music in a film or performing the song at a high school
dance—is barred from doing so, even if she were to secure permission
from 2 Live Crew.23 The Supreme Court’s ruling that 2 Live Crew’s use
is fair does not mean that the subsequent use would be deemed fair too.
Similarly, if a screenwriter wanted to produce a movie based on Alice
Randall’s book, The Wind Done Gone, and she properly purchased rights
from Alice Randall, she would not be readily able to embark upon this
task. Although Alice Randall’s use of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind was ruled to be fair,24 every subsequent user of her work would be
20
See Horace G. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944) (“Fair use
is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the
appropriation is reasonable and customary.”); Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 135, 141 (2011) (“Fair use now represents an excuse to justify
infringement, or in other words, an exception to the norm of speech suppression through
copyright.”).
21
Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1198.
22
510 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1994).
23
The industry practice for obtaining licenses for musical performance is sufficiently welldeveloped and complex that the would-be user would likely be able to obtain the relevant
licenses without direct communication with either Campbell (who owns the rights to 2 Live
Crew’s song) or Acuff-Rose (who owns the rights to Orbison’s). For purposes of our example,
we ignore the industry practice.
24
See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that “a viable fair use defense is available” for The Wind Done Gone’s potential
infringement of Suntrust’s copyright in Gone with the Wind).
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exposed to an infringement claim, unless she secured a license from the
owners of Gone with the Wind who, as one may recall, refused to license
Alice Randall’s use. Fair use findings are in personam; they only pertain
to a specific user. Copyright protection, by contrast, is in rem; it avails
against the rest of the world.25 This creates a vast amount of uncertainty.
In this Article, we propose a dramatic reformation of the fair use
doctrine, consisting of three complementary steps. First, we introduce a
new conception of fair use, under which fair use could constitute an in
rem, property remedy. This new conception of fair use would supplement,
rather than supplant, the existing fair use doctrine. Under the new in rem
property conception, a fair use finding would assist not only the particular
defendant who raised the fair use defense but also all subsequent users of
a work that had been found to fairly incorporate copyright content. Thus,
the in rem version of fair use would take on the form of a property incident
that benefits all future users, and it would therefore enhance the
marketability of follow-on works employing the fair use.
Second, we would grant courts the power to decide which conception
of fair use, if any, to adopt in each case. Upon a finding of fair use, the
judge could adopt either the traditional in personam version or our new in
rem version of fair use. Judges would not be required to adopt the in rem
version of fair use in every case. In appropriate circumstances, the judge
could stick to the traditional approach to fair use, limiting it to the specific
user and the specific use. The upshot of our proposal would be a legal
menu with three options: denying fair use, finding an in personam fair
use, or finding an in rem fair use.
Third, we propose a set of default rules for all fair use cases. Where
judges choose not to specify whether their finding of fair use is of the in
personam or in rem variety, we propose that default rules make that
decision. However, the default setting of fair use would depend on the
type of use being examined. Specifically, where the claimed fair use
consists of incorporating the protected copyrighted material in a new
copyrighted work—such as the Android operating system, or the “Pretty

25

See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1032 (2008) (“[P]roperty rights, as defined by the
government, are rights in rem, which avail against the world . . . .”); Guy Pessach, Toward A
New Jurisprudence of Copyright Exemptions, 55 Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 287, 291 (2015)
(“Copyright owners’ entitlements are in rem exclusive property rights . . . owners have the
right to exclude the rest of the world from utilizing their copyrighted works for uses that fall
within their bundle of exclusive uses.”).
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Woman” song—the default fair use would be of the in rem variety. In
such cases, if the judge failed to specify otherwise, future users of the fair
use follow-on work could utilize that work without having to relitigate the
issue of infringement with the owner of the original copyrighted work.
However, in all other cases of claimed fair use, the traditional, familiar in
personam conception of fair use would be the default setting. This set of
default rules would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair uses,
but permit judges to tailor their rulings case by case.
We propose that the result of a successful invocation of an in rem fair
use defense should create effects like those in the world of property.
Under our suggested interpretation, where the judge chooses the in rem
variety of fair use, a fair use ruling in favor of any particular user would
continue to run with the work for the benefit of subsequent users with
respect to the relevant content covered by the ruling. Specifically, any
unlicensed incorporation of copyrighted material that was ruled a fair use
would be seen as creating a permanent copyright defense that runs with
the work, akin to a property easement. Were a court to rule that a
particular user made fair use of a preexisting work, subsequent users of
the follow-on work that was found to fairly use preexisting material would
also be protected by the ruling. These subsequent users could utilize the
preexisting material in the follow-on work with assurance that their use
too would be deemed fair. For example, if Google’s use of Oracle’s Java
APIs were not merely a fair use but an in rem fair use, not just Google but
every programmer for Android phones who uses Google’s Android
system will be sheltered from liability, even though Android incorporates
11,500 lines of code from Oracle’s API.26
Our proposal has three significant advantages relative to extant fair use
doctrine. First, our proposal would increase certainty with respect to the
use of copyrighted work. Currently, a fair use finding only helps the
named defendants in the case. It does not pertain to other users who wish
to make the same use of the copyrighted work. Under current law, other
users either have to take their chances in court or negotiate a license from

26

Perhaps due to the litigation, Google ultimately abandoned use of Oracle’s Java API, and
later versions of Android did not involve any copying of Oracle’s copyrighted work. Oracle,
141 S. Ct. at 1191. Our comments relate to early versions of Android that still incorporated
Oracle’s work. An early ruling in favor of in rem fair use for Google might have left parts of
Oracle’s API in the Android program.
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the owner.27 The adoption of our proposal would allow judges in fair use
cases to put other potential users on solid ground by allowing them to
engage in the same use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach
would permit tailoring remedies to the needs of the fair use. Judges could
take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, and deny
future in rem employment of a fair use remedy, when appropriate. The
default settings of fair use would create clarity about the meaning of fair
use decisions in any particular case where the judge chose not to
elaborate.
Second, our proposal would potentially lower transaction and litigation
costs for creators of new works.28 As we explained, current doctrine
requires users of works that fairly incorporate materials from preexisting
works to negotiate licenses from both the original owner and the fair user
or plead their own new fair use in court. Both options are costly. Our
proposal potentially alleviates this burden, conserving judicial resources
while lowering costs for the parties themselves.
Third, and finally, our proposal would increase the productive use of
copyrighted content. The sheltering principle would enable multiple
downstream users to create new works that incorporate past works that
were found by courts to make fair uses of older works.
The remainder of the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explain
the shortcomings of extant fair use doctrine, focusing on the inherent
limitations arising from fair use’s understanding as a personal, usespecific defense to copyright infringement. In particular, we discuss the
costs that current fair use jurisprudence imposes on follow-on creators. In
Part II, we turn to the world of property, where one finds such doctrines
as market overt and the law of easements, which promote the
marketability of rights and give use rights an in rem character. In Part III,
we draw on our discussion of property law to call for the introduction of
a brand-new conception of fair use that would operate as a property
incident, in the sense that it would benefit all subsequent users of a work
that obtained a fair use status. Finally, in Part IV, we provide an important
context for our amended understanding of fair use by showing that other
27
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
Yale L.J. 882, 890 (2007) (stating that since the fair use doctrine is ambiguous and the cost of
losing an infringement case is prohibitively high, “even a risk-neutral actor with a good fair
use claim would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of incurring a severe
penalty”).
28
For discussion, see infra Section I.B.
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parts of the law of copyright that struggle with similar problems have
employed mechanisms that bear a great deal of resemblance to our
proposal.
I. THE LIMITATIONS OF FAIR USE DOCTRINE TODAY
A. Extant Fair Use Law
Fair use is an equitable defense to copyright infringement, originally
developed judicially despite the statutory origins of copyright.29
Importantly for our purposes, fair use is highly contextualized. Section
107 of the Copyright Act, in which the modern fair use doctrine is
enshrined, provides courts with two anchors in making fair use
determinations.30 The preamble of section 107 gives courts a nonexhaustive list of presumptively fair uses, such as criticism, news
reporting, commentary, teaching, research, and scholarship.31 Courts may
use this list to determine if the use at hand falls within one of the
enumerated categories of fair uses. The latter part of section 107 gives
courts four factors to consider and balance in making their final decision
on fair use. Section 107 instructs courts to consider: (1) the purpose of the
allegedly infringing use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work allegedly
being infringed; (3) the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted
material taken by the allegedly infringing use; and (4) the effect of a fair
use finding on the actual and potential value for the allegedly infringed
upon copyrighted work.32
In construing the statutory criteria, courts at different times have
weighted certain factors more heavily than others. At present, courts tend
to focus on the transformativeness of the claimed fair use when compared
to the original work, leading courts to pay particular attention to the
purpose of the defendant’s use and the use’s effect on the value of the
copyrighted work—statutory factors (1) and (4), respectively.33 That said,

29

Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal Theory 347,
350 (1997) (“The doctrine of fair use originated in the decisions of the English Law and Equity
courts.”).
30
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 179, 189 (1995)
(“[T]he Court has emphasized . . . that the fourth factor—the impact on the potential market
value of the plaintiff’s work—is to receive the most weight.”).
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fair use cases are notoriously difficult to rationalize; as Pamela Samuelson
has shown, fair use rules are highly context-dependent, and it is difficult
to summarize all fair use law in a single approach.34
Fair use is probably the most celebrated doctrine in the law of copyright
and often the fulcrum on which authors’ rights and users’ interests are
balanced against each other. Yet, by virtue of the fair use doctrine’s
current design, it has only a limited ability to ensure broad use of works.
As it stands, the fair use doctrine provides a very limited privilege, or
shelter, to users.
Fair use findings are individualized in two central ways: 1) per user and
2) per use. Take the example of a blogger who excerpts a short quotation
from a copyrighted political speech as part of a blog entry on politics. If
a court were to find this use fair, this finding would necessarily be
confined to the specific blogger and her individual circumstances. If
subsequently a mainstream media outlet were to quote exactly the same
words from the same copyrighted political speech in its own news report,
the mainstream media outlet could not be certain that its own use would
be considered a fair use. Indeed, even if the mainstream media outlet
secured permission from the blogger to utilize the entire blog entry, and
its only use of the quotation was in the context of reprinting the blog entry
in its entirety, the media outlet would still need to negotiate its own
license with the writer of the speech or make its own, separate claim of
fair use over the quote. The same is true for other online users. They, too,
could not reproduce, adapt or circulate the content of the blog even with
the blogger’s permission. The blogger’s fair use finding would be of no
avail to them. Their use would not be part of the blogger’s fair use.
No less importantly, even the original blogger who won a court ruling
in favor of her fair use of the quotation in her blog entry could not be sure
that the use would still be fair if she then adapted her blog entry into
something else. For example, if she were to turn the blog entry into a book
chapter, add accompanying video of the speech to the original blog entry,
or add a few words to the quotation, she would again expose herself to a
risk of copyright liability. While the use of the copyright content in a
particular literary form was ruled fair, it does mean that its incorporation
into a different literary form, or a different copyrighted non-literary form
would qualify as fair, as well.

34

Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 1, at 2540–41.
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Accordingly, if in the famous Supreme Court case Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,35 the Supreme Court had found the
Nation’s quotations from Gerald Ford’s autobiography, Time to Heal,
fair, other magazines and reporters could still not reproduce the content
of the Nation’s article, even with permission from the magazine. The fair
use ruling would not pertain to them.
This inherent limitation of fair use is especially problematic when
information moves through interconnected networks.36 As many scholars
have noted, the norm among internet users is to share content
instantaneously.37 It is unreasonable to expect users to understand the fine
details of copyright law. There is little reason to suspect that users will
have any idea that content that was uploaded lawfully based on a fair use
finding may not be further downloaded and further distributed by them.
Paradoxically, fair use findings can become a trap to the unwary. They
“clear” rights for a single user who was sued and prevailed in court,
allowing her to continue to use the content in the particular manner
authorized by the court, but have no effect on other users.
This shortcoming of fair use can be seen in the most dramatic way in
the recent Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle,38 widely
recognized as a critically important fair use case.39 The matter was
brought to court after Oracle accused Google of copying thirty-seven

35

471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy
102–03 (2008).
37
See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash,
84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1251, 1253 (2011) (“Sharing unlicensed copyrighted materials is now a part
of teenagers’ everyday lives.”); Madhavi Sunder, IP³, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 263 (2006)
(observing that we are living in the “‘Participation Age’ of remix culture, blogs, podcasts,
wikis, and peer-to-peer filesharing,” which in turn leads a “new generation [to view]
intellectual properties as the raw materials for its own creative acts, blurring the lines that have
long separated producers from consumers”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 548 (pointing out that digital
technology “has enabled unparalleled manipulation and use of creative works by ordinary
individuals”).
38
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2021); Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (remanding “for further proceedings on
Google’s fair use defense”).
39
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software’s Fair Use Future, 31
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 535, 536–37 (2018) (“How the Federal Circuit decides Oracle’s appeal of
a jury verdict in favor of Google’s fair use defense will have significant implications for future
software copyright fair use cases because Oracle, in effect, calls into question the viability of
fair use defenses in all API reuse cases (and perhaps in software cases more generally).”).
36
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packages from its API.40 Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, had
developed a programming language called Java that included a number of
elements including the Java API. Google incorporated the structure and
organization of the contested API into the Android operating system.41 As
part of the process, Google rewrote the Java API, but many of the
commands in the Android API remained identical to Oracle’s API.42 In
total, 11,500 lines of code were copied.43
Java API was originally developed by Sun Microsystems, and Google
sought a negotiated license from Sun to use the API and other elements
of Java.44 Negotiations failed to reach fruition, and a bitter clash arose.
Oracle bought out Sun, and with the company, ownership of the API. In
2010, Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement.45 The case
proceeded in two rounds. The first round concentrated on the eligibility
of APIs for copyright protection. The District Court for the Northern
District of California ruled that APIs were uncopyrightable as “there is
only one way to declare a given method functionality, [so that] everyone
using that function must write that specific line of code in the same
way.”46 Citing various copyright doctrines ranging from the judicial
“merger” doctrine to the statutory exclusion of “methods of operation,”
the court determined that the challenged parts of the code were outside
the scope of copyright protection.47 The Federal Circuit reversed, ruling
that APIs were entitled to copyright protection.48 Google’s petition for
certiorari was denied.49
This gave rise to the second round of litigation, revolving around the
issue of fair use. In 2016, a jury agreed that Google’s use of the API
qualified as a fair use.50 To the dismay of many commentators,51 the
40

Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1193.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 1186.
44
Id. at 1190.
45
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
46
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
47
Id. at 996 & n.7 (citing Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and
Processes from the Scope of Protection, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1921, 1921 (2007)); id. at 997, 1001–
02.
48
750 F.3d at 1381.
49
750 F.3d 1339, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015).
50
Oracle Am. Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
51
See, e.g., Ieva Giedrimaite, No Allies for Oracle’s Win Against Google, The IPKat (Mar.
25, 2019), https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/03/no-allies-for-oracles-win-against-google.
html [https://perma.cc/8Q5M-WD2L].
41
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Federal Circuit reversed the decision again, holding that Google’s use was
not fair as a matter of law.52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in 2021, reversed the
Federal Circuit’s second decision.53 Stressing that fair use is “flexible,”
requiring “judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances,”
where “application may well vary depending upon context,” the Court
endorsed Google’s argument that copying parts of Oracle’s Java API was
a transformative use, and therefore non-infringing, fair use of Oracle’s
Java program.54 This absolved Google of liability. However, the ruling
does not shelter any other technology companies that use Google’s
program copying parts of the Java API in their apps written for Android
phones. The Android operating system is employed in such a large
number of applications that any attempt to estimate that number would be
a mere conjecture. The favorable decision for Google does not carry over
to any of the other companies that use the code. Of course, Google’s fair
use victory serves as a precedent and, as such, might make it more
difficult for Oracle to prevail against other companies that used Google’s
code with permission and encouragement from Google. However, many
of them may simply not have the financial wherewithal to fight the case
in court and may choose to settle with Oracle or, worse, cease to operate.55
This scenario demonstrates the limitation of fair use as a personal
privilege that applies to the particular defendant, as opposed to the work.
Had fair use attached to the protected work, i.e. the copyrighted
expression, be it code, lyrics, audiovisual content, or other forms of art, it
would shield all subsequent creators who use the content. The work at
issue in Oracle v. Google was an open-source operating system that was
purposefully designed and distributed to be used by multiple individuals
and companies.56 Such works expose the limited ability of fair use to
ensure broad use privileges. However, even in cases involving other
copyrightable subject matter, the same problem arises.
To see this, consider the case of Campbell v. Acuff Rose, in which the
Supreme Court ruled that 2 Live Crew’s version of Roy Orbison’s “Oh

52

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2021).
54
Id. at 1204.
55
Google ultimately stopped using the copied code. Android programmers utilizing later
versions of the program are therefore shielded from liability to Oracle, despite the limited
nature of the fair use defense. Supra note 26.
56
886 F.3d at 1186–87.
53
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Pretty Woman” constituted a parody of the original and thus qualified as
a fair use.57 The Supreme Court’s ruling allowed 2 Live Crew to continue
to perform the song and distribute it. If, however, a subsequent creator
wanted to use 2 Live Crew’s song in a movie or a video game, she would
not be able to do so even though she obtained permission from 2 Live
Crew without also obtaining rights to the Roy Orbison song. Subsequent
uses are not directly affected by a fair use finding.
As another example, consider Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, a
literary adaptation of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind that
presented the story from the vantage point of the African-American
characters.58 After a prolonged legal battle, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
Alice Randall’s book was a parody of Gone with the Wind and hence
constituted fair use.59 The decision enabled Alice Randall’s publisher to
continue with the distribution of the book. However, if she were to try to
sell her movie rights to a studio, the fair use ruling would not carry over.
Similarly, if an independent theater wished to produce a play based on the
book, it would be risking an infringement suit. The fair use ruling pertains
to Alice’s Randall’s use alone. It does not protect Randall’s book in any
other context.
B. The Costs of Fair Use in Its Current Form
Under the current regime, users who desire to use content that fairly
incorporates preexisting copyright materials have two options: they can
either obtain licenses from all the rightsholders involved, past and present,
or use the content without permission, risk a lawsuit, and put their faith in
the fair use defense. The first option raises the twin specters of high
transaction costs and strategic behavior. This is especially true when
multiple parties hold copyrights to the content, as in the case of
documentary films.60 The second option implies litigation costs and
uncertainty about the legal outcome. The fair use defense has many

57

510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
59
Id. at 1277.
60
See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 Utah L. Rev.
715, 717–18 (discussing how documentary filmmaking has contributed to “the increasing
reliance of motion picture production on the appropriation of reality . . . giv[ing] rise to
tensions that have been expressed in terms of conflicts over copyright”).
58
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virtues,61 but certainty is not one of them.62 If the fair use defense fails in
court, the defendant who raised it may not only lose her right to use the
material but may also be ordered to pay statutory damages to the plaintiff,
far in excess of the value she derived from the use. The higher costs
associated with the use of works that fairly incorporate preexisting
copyrighted materials significantly impair their marketability. We
elaborate on this problem below.
1. Licenses
Users who wish to use (copy, display, perform, etc.) a copyrighted
work can secure a license to do so from the relevant rightsholders. In fact,
this is the point and purpose of establishing copyright protection in the
first place.63 Copyright law does not reward authors and creators with
cash payments upon creation of a new work. Rather, the law grants them
a bundle of exclusive rights.64 The expectation is that authors will earn
their rewards from users who pay for licenses to perform one or more of
the rights that would otherwise be exclusive to the author.65 Users, in other
words, pay to use the content, and it is the payment that is the point of
making the rights exclusive in the first place.
This dynamic applies no less to works that incorporate preexisting
copyrighted materials, which are ubiquitous. Films are often adaptations
of copyrighted written work. News broadcasts incorporate film clips
61
Peter Jaszi et al., Evaluating the Benefits of Fair Use: A Response to the PWC Report on
the Costs and Benefits of ‘Fair Use’ 3 (Apr. 15, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2773646 [https://perma.cc/NB6V-J32A].
62
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 1, at 1087 (discussing fair use’s lack of clarity); Jason
Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 395, 415 (2009) (noting that fair
use fails to give sufficient guidance to users).
63
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 59–60 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has held consistently and
unanimously that American law explicitly treats intellectual property rights in utilitarian
terms . . . .”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (emphasizing that one of copyright law’s central goals
is to maintain incentives for individuals to produce creative works); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 129 (2004)
(same).
64
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 Mich.
L. Rev. 231, 240–41 (2014) (explaining that copyright law incentivizes the creation of original
expressive works by conferring a bundle of exclusive rights on authors).
65
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?,
12 Theoretical Inquiries L. 29, 30 (2011) (“An exclusive right to license or vend the work for
a limited time period permits markets for public goods to form.”).
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created by various authors. Computer programs often include previously
copyrighted graphics or code. A movie theater that wants to screen a film
to the public must obtain a license not only from the studio that owns
rights to the film, but also from the copyright owners of the previously
copyrighted written work on which the film was based. This means that
the more preexisting copyrighted works are incorporated into a new work,
the greater the number of licenses that must be obtained to use the new
work.66
As is the case with any system that relies on market transactions,
purchasing licenses inevitably involves transactions costs. Transaction
costs typically include the cost of identifying the relevant rightsholder,
negotiating with her, formalizing a legal agreement, and enforcing it.
Typically, the higher the number of rightsholders whose consent needs to
be obtained, the higher the transaction costs. In the simplest case of a new
work utilizing an older work, users would have to secure a license from
at least two rightsholders: the copyright owner in the original work and
the copyright owner in the follow-on work who fairly employed
expressive content from the original work. For example, a fan wishing to
start a “Grateful Dead” webpage and include in it photos of poster art
from the book Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip would be thwarted
from doing so, even though the use of the photos in the original book was
ruled fair.67 The fact that a court ruled that Dorling Kinderseley’s use of
the photographic content was fair does not carry over to other users.
It is easy to see how the attempt to secure permission from all necessary
rightsholders might run aground due to high transaction costs. For
instance, a filmmaker who plans to negotiate with all the relevant
rightsholders would need to expend substantial resources in the process:
the mere task of identifying all the rightsholders may require resources in
excess of the expected revenues from the movie. It is therefore not
surprising that documentary filmmakers often do not even try to negotiate
with all the relevant rightsholders and rely on fair use instead. But even
in cases where the relevant rightsholders are readily identifiable, a user
66
The law and economics literature points to a positive correlation between the number of
rightsholders and the level of transaction costs. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1015, 1060 (2015) (“Multiparty
agreements typically involve higher coordination costs and as the number of parties grows, so
does the likelihood of an impasse.”).
67
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006)
(concluding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s “copyrighted images in its book
Illustrated Trip is fair use”).
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still needs to negotiate the terms of the use with them and formalize an
agreement to this effect. In some cases, enforcement costs are also likely
to arise. The expenditures a user incurs in the process—namely, the
transaction costs—go to waste; they do not benefit the copyright owner
or the user. In some cases, the benefit a user derives from the use of a
work would justify incurring the transaction costs, as well as paying the
copyright owner her asking price.68
Our discussion so far ignored a different problem that is likely to arise
in negotiations with multiple rightsholders: strategic holdouts. When a
party must secure permissions from multiple rightsholders, each of whom
holds a veto power over the enterprise as a whole, there is no reason for
any of the veto holders to sell easily.69 Each rightsholder knows that the
revenue for the entire project depends on her consent. Each rightsholder
therefore should demand the maximum share of the revenue she can get
without bringing the project to a halt, up to the full value of the project.
The price each rightsholder demands is therefore strategic—it depends
not only on the value of the rights to the rightsholder but also, more
importantly, on an evaluation of the prices other rightsholders will
demand and receive. None of the rightsholders has any reason to moderate
her demands excessively. This increases the likelihood that negotiations
will fail, especially when the negotiations are often undertaken in
situations of imperfect information and miscalculations. Each of the
rightsholders is trying to outwit the other rightsholders in order to end up
with the highest achievable share—one rightsholder may end up
demanding too much, leading to the failure of the entire project.
2. Fair Use
Failed negotiations are not necessarily the end of the line for follow-on
works. The author, attempting to create a new work incorporating old
works, may decide that the licensing efforts are not worth it, or the author
68
It is precisely for this reason that Wendy Gordon listed market failure—including
prohibitive transaction costs—as the first prerequisite for recognizing fair use by her lights.
See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 1, at 1614–15, 1627–28.
69
See generally Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law 216–17 (2004)
(justifying eminent domain as a mechanism for overcoming holdouts); Steven Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 124 (2004) (discussing the problem of holdouts in
the context of government acquisitions of property); Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through
Eminent Domain: Justifications, Limitations, and Alternatives, in Research Handbook on the
Economics of Property Law 344, 345–49 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011)
(same).
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may try to obtain the relevant licenses and fail, but the author may still
proceed on the basis of the fair use doctrine. Stated bluntly, the author
may gamble that the use of the older works without a license will be found
a “fair use” by courts, obviating the need to obtain a license. Indeed, the
author may decide to initiate this gamble even if transaction costs are not
prohibitive, in order to try to obtain the rights for free.
Alas, fair use is not a straightforward gamble. The problem with fair
use is its vagueness—indeed, it is so vague that Larry Lessig famously
defined fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer.”70 Judge Pierre Leval openly
posited that fair use is vague by design and admitted that even judges do
not have a shared understanding of what fair use is.71 Other scholars have
argued that the vagueness of the fair use test is a welcome and necessary
feature of the doctrine.72
The ambiguity of fair use imposes a real cost on users.73 Users who rely
on the fair use defense cannot know for certain how their defense will be
treated by the court. As is true of other open-ended standards that rely on
a balancing test, fair use inevitably leads to overdeterrence and underuse
of works.74 Users cannot know in advance whether their use is fair, and
the harsh consequences of error will deter much use of copyrighted works.
A potential user who considers a use to have a high likelihood of being
fair may nevertheless forego the use for fear of losing in court and
exposing herself to the risk of having to pay the plaintiff large amounts of

70
Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity 187 (2004).
71
See generally Leval, supra note 1, at 1106 (“Judges do not share a consensus on the
meaning of fair use.”).
72
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 121, 140 (1999)
(“[F]air use appears to be employed in situations of high transaction costs, where a muddy
entitlement may be appropriate . . . . The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing standard of fair use
allows courts to reallocate what the market cannot.”).
73
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1483,
1486 (2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness over ex ante certainty
comes at a steep cost for potential users of copyrighted works.”).
74
See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that when the “probability [of
liability] declines as defendants take more care, then defendants may tend to overcomply”);
Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ.
& Org. 279, 280 (1986) (arguing that overcompliance is a common effect of some types of
uncertain rules); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are made to pay more
than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially
beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed”).
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money. It should be borne in mind that the Copyright Act entitles
successful plaintiffs to the defendant’s profits75 from the infringement and
to statutory damages of up to $150,000 per willful infringement.76 Hence,
users who have blind faith in fair use take a high-stakes gamble.77 The
safer bet may be to obtain a relatively low-cost insurance policy in the
form of an unnecessary license.
In an influential article, James Gibson pointed out that the vague nature
of fair use leads to “right accretion” by copyright holders.78 Since many
users are understandably reluctant to take a chance on the fair use
doctrine, many of them prefer to obtain licenses from copyright holders
even for potentially fair uses. This dynamic invariably leads to an
expansion of the rights of copyright owners and a contraction of the
domain of fair use. Over time, as this process repeats itself with respect
to more and more uses that could be ruled fair, copyright owners gain
more control over the use of their work.79
Of course, users also have the option of not using the work at all. Per
our earlier discussion, they would resort to this option when transaction
costs are high or when they expect strategic holdouts to arise and block
the path to a successful license. Indeed, all courses of action that are open
to users are costly. These additional costs undermine the marketability of
the works involved and could be avoided if subsequent users were
sheltered by the original fair use finding received by the first user.
II. PROPERTY LAW AND THE PROBLEMS OF FAIR USE
Our proposal to reform fair use law draws its inspiration from the world
of property. In order to explain our proposal, we restate in property terms
our observations in Part I about the flaws of fair use. The two central flaws
of extant fair use law can be described in property terms as follows. First,
extant fair use doctrine recognizes personal use rights rather than rights
75

17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2018) (stating that a copyright infringer is, by default, liable for
any of “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer”).
76
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).
77
See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00-CIV-472, 2000 WL 1262568, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (finding MP3.com liable for approximately $118 million in statutory
damages); see also J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against
Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 545–49 (2004) (pointing out the punitive nature
of statutory damages in copyright law).
78
Gibson, supra note 27, at 887–95.
79
See id.
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in rem. Second, and relatedly, the fair use rights recognized by law are
not marketable. Each of these flaws is analogous to problems that
potentially appear in many property contexts, and each of these flaws has
typically associated property solutions. In this Part, we explain how
property law provides analogous solutions to each of these flaws.
A. Use Rights
Let us begin with the first of the two flaws. As we noted, fair use
doctrine recognizes the right of a particular user to a particular use of a
particular work.80 2 Live Crew’s fair use right to parts of Roy Orbison’s
“Oh Pretty Woman” in its own “Pretty Woman” song is limited personally
to 2 Live Crew; the band’s victory in its own fair use case does not ensure
that a different band parodying Orbison’s song would win. Likewise, 2
Live Crew’s victory is limited to a particular use of a particular work; we
could no longer be certain that it was a fair use if 2 Live Crew used
Orbison’s song in a different work (say, “Prettier Man”) or used more of
Orbison’s song in the same work.
It may seem obvious that any fair use that is limited to a particular use
of a particular work must necessarily be personal and limited to a
particular user. However, the law of property teaches otherwise.
While we tend to think of property as centered on objects or things,81
property law often deals with use rights.82 The law of servitudes—
easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, profits à prendre, and
others—gives rightsholders legal authority to use realty83 even though
80

Supra Part I.
See John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law 3–4 (4th ed. 2017) (noting that
most people think of property as “things”); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things,
125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1693–94 (2012); Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic
Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law Property, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (2012); Eric R.
Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 Seattle U. L. Rev. 617, 618 (2009);
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 1 (3d ed. 2017). See
generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev.
531, 576 (2005) (noting that the “popular imagination” continues to associate the idea of
property with things).
82
Chang & Smith, supra note 81, at 23.
83
Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 982–89. Easements can also be negative. A negative
easement entitles the holder to prevent a certain use of the parcel to which the easement
applies. Traditionally, the common law recognized only four negative easements: (1) blocking
windows, (2) interfering with air flow in a defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for
buildings, and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an artificial channel. See Jesse
Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander & Michael H. Schill, Property 736 (6th
ed. 2006).
81
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another person owns the land. Consider a standard right-of-way easement
between Blackacre owned by Alice and Greyacre owned by Beatrice. The
most convenient route for Alice to drive to Blackacre is over a strip of
Greyacre. Property law allows Alice to secure a right to drive over
Greyacre without purchasing title to the necessary strip of land.84 Instead,
Alice can purchase an easement—a use right—that leaves title to the strip
of land in the hands of Beatrice, but gives Alice a right to drive to and
from her garage over that strip of land that is recognized and protected by
the law of property. Easements, by their nature, attach to the land.85 The
burdened land (known as the servient tenement in property law)—
Greyacre in our example—is subject to the easement even if there is a
change in ownership.86 Accordingly, if Beatrice transfers Greyacre to
Claire, Alice will not need to repurchase the easement from Claire.
Rather, the easement is embedded in Claire’s title; she acquired title to
the land subject to the easement.87 Typically, easements are appurtenant,88
meaning they attach to the land on the benefited side as well (in property
terminology, the benefited land is known as the dominant tenement).
Thus, if the benefited parcel—Blackacre in our example—is transferred
from Alice to Danielle, Danielle would benefit from the easement as it is
part of the title to Blackacre.89
Easements are flexible tools. For instance, they can be constructed with
time limits. Alice and Beatrice might agree, for example, to give the

84
John H. Pearson, Easement Defined, in 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.02 (David A.
Thomas ed., 1994) (“[A]n easement is one of several ways in which one may obtain rights in
the land of another, for the benefit of one’s own property or for one’s own personal benefit.”).
85
Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 983; Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of
Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1264 (1982).
86
Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.07(a) (“The very nature of an easement, and a major point
justifying its existence, is to guarantee that an arrangement for the non-possessory use of land
survives the transfer of that land into the hands of another.”).
87
Id.
88
Indeed, English law originally refused to recognize the validity of easements in gross.
French, supra note 85, at 1267–68.
89
Property law also recognizes easements in gross. Unlike appurtenant easements,
easements in gross do not attach to the land and do not run with the title to it. Rather, they are
personal in nature and benefit particular individuals. In our previous example, Beatrice could
have made the easement personal to Alice, rendering it an easement in gross. In such a case,
the easement would continue to benefit Alice even if she sold her title to Blackacre and moved
elsewhere, but it would not automatically benefit Danielle who purchased title to Blackacre
from Alice. In the past, easements in gross were considered non-transferrable. This is no
longer the case. Under modern property law, even easements in gross are transferable. See
Dukeminier et al., supra note 83, at 714–16.
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easement a five-year life. At the same time, many features of easements
are dictated by property law and cannot be modified by the parties. For
instance, an easement is the necessary result of the transfer of a nonpossessory right in real property properly attested to by deed, even if the
parties did not know they were creating an easement. Thus, in the case of
Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, the court determined that an
agreement giving Baseball Publishing a five-year right to place an
advertising billboard on the side of Bruton’s building was an easement in
gross even though the agreement described the right as a “lease” and
Bruton claimed the right was merely a “license.”90 According to the court,
a property right becomes an easement according to its features (in this
case, a written agreement to create non-possessory, exclusive use right in
real property) without regard to the terminology preferred by the parties.
Property law even accommodates the possible right to prevent a certain
use of land. A negative easement, for instance, gives the easement holder
the right to prevent the owner of land from undertaking certain acts.91 A
conservation easement (a popular type of negative easement) gives the
easement holder the right to block high-impact development of the
burdened land.92 Other negative easements may prevent owners of the
burdened land from building in such a manner as to block a view or to
remove a support wall.93
Property law accommodates other use rights as well. Where easements
cannot be stretched to cover a particular non-use right, property law
permits the use of covenants or equitable servitudes.94 Covenants and
equitable servitudes are commitments to perform or not to perform
actions that “touch and concern” land, and they are anchored in property

90

18 N.E.2d 362, 362–64 (1938).
Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 988.
92
See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.02(e)(4) (“The conservation easement is a
negative easement that prevents the fee owner from making use of the land in ways that would
compromise its preservation”); Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the
Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40 Hastings L.J. 1187, 1193–94 (1989).
93
See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.02(a) (noting that an easement “[m]ay
involve the right to act upon the land of another”); J.B. Ruhl, The “Background Principles” of
Natural Capital and Ecosystems Services—Did Lucas Open Pandora’s Box?, 22 J. Land Use
& Env’t L. 525, 534 (2007) (noting that the four types of traditionally recognized negative
easements were: “the rights to stop other landowners from (1) blocking one’s windows, (2)
interfering with the flow of air in a defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for
buildings, and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an artificial channel”).
94
Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 983.
91
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law rather than contract law.95 Where the covenant or equitable servitude
is successfully created, successors to title in the land are bound by the
commitments of their predecessors. For instance, in the famous case of
Tulk v. Moxhay, Moxhay became the owner of Leicester Square garden,
which had once been owned by Tulk.96 In 1808, Tulk had sold the garden
to Elms, a predecessor of Moxhay in title, and Elms promised to maintain
the premises as a garden and never to build in the garden. The court held
that Moxhay could be held to Elms’s promise because the promise was
one that ran with the land to successors in title,97 under a doctrine that
came to be known as equitable servitude.98
Use rights are an indispensable form of property rights in
condominiums and other common interest communities.99 Fellow owners
in the common interest community need to know that their neighbors will
continue paying for the upkeep of common areas, for example, and that
they will respect parking arrangements. A buyer of a condominium unit,
therefore, does not merely buy title to land. She also subjects herself to a
complex set of property arrangements concerning use that are anchored
in a document called the Declaration or the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions (“CCR”). The use rights and burdens in the
Declaration are a crucial part of the property package owned by every
owner in the common interest community.100
All these use rights in land have a common feature. They are
recognized and enforced by property law and attach to someone other than
the owner of the burdened land.101 When Eloise owns an easement over
95
See William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 472, 475 (3d ed.
2000); Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 982–83, 986.
96
Tulk v. Moxhay (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch).
97
Id.
98
Note, Equitable Restrictions in Land and Tulk v. Moxhay in Virginia, 39 Va. L. Rev. 703
(1953).
99
See Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Property Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency,
Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. 187, 192 (2009) (“Condominiums, like all common-interest communities, are
distinguished by their complex system of servitudes and the governance structure designed to
amend and enforce the applicable covenants.”).
100
See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Governing Communities by Auction, 81
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that “[i]n homeowners’ and condominium associations,
the servitudes are generally aggregated in a large document called the covenants, conditions,
and regulations (CCR)”).
101
See, e.g., Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il Davorge, 102 Cal Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (“[A] major distinction between the typical adhesion contract and CC&R’s is that,
once the homeowners have made their purchases, they ordinarily have the collective power to

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Propertizing Fair Use

1279

Francine’s land, both Eloise and Francine own property rights, but only
Francine has title in the burdened land. Francine continues to have an
exclusive right of possession (subject to Eloise’s easement). Francine can
sell her land, mortgage it, transmit ownership of it by will, and do all the
other things an owner can, subject only to the caveat that her ownership
and that of any successor in interest will continue to be subject to the use
right protected by Eloise’s easement.102
As we will explain later in this Part, our proposal would create an
option for judges to treat fair use rights as durable use rights in the way
property law treats use rights. Ownership of the copyrighted work would
continue to remain with the author or the successor in interest. However,
the fair use too would take on the features of a legally cognizable use right
that is not merely personal.
B. Market Overt
We now turn to the second of the two flaws we noted in Part I: the lack
of marketability of fair uses. As we noted, fair uses are restricted to the
particular use by the particular user. Follow-on users undertaking uses
identical to the fair use cannot be certain that they too will be found to
have used the copyrighted work fairly. The term marketability is used in
a number of different ways in property law; what interests us here is the
ability to turn a personal privilege into a durable property right that can
be transferred to others in certain circumstances. This is perhaps best
understood by considering the property doctrines of “market overt.”
Market overt literally means open or “public market,”103 but when
property lawyers speak of “market overt,” they are referring to the set of
doctrines under which a seller with defective title can transfer good title
to a bona fide purchaser.104 There are different rules of market overt for
chattels and realty. As we shall see, the market overt rules of realty are of
particular interest for our proposal.

amend the CC&R’s to suit their changing needs. (Civ. Code, § 1355.) This is because the
CC&R’s, unlike most contracts, establish a system of governance.”).
102
See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60 (describing the law of easements).
103
See J.G. Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 Colum.
L. Rev. 375, 375 (1908) (“‘Market overt’ means a public market . . . .”).
104
See Harold R. Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and Feckless Agents: Judges
and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1981)
(describing the market overt doctrine).
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One of the basic principles of property law in transfers of title is nemo
dat quod non habet, which means one cannot transfer what one does not
have.105 As a general rule, a buyer cannot acquire better title than the seller
had. If Irene owns 50% of Blackacre, she cannot sell to Jacqueline more
than 50% of Blackacre; if Irene has no ownership interest at all, she
cannot sell anything to Jacqueline. The rules of market overt are an
important exception to nemo dat quod non habet.106 Under the rules of
market overt, if the buyer purchases a good in good faith, and fulfills other
conditions, she can acquire good title in the object even though the seller
did not own the object at all.107
The term “market overt” is taken from a medieval English doctrine that
provided a very broad exception to the general rule of nemo dat. In the
medieval doctrine, anyone who purchased chattel in a chartered or
customary marketplace in the open, in a transaction conducted in public,
would acquire good title to the good, no matter what its provenance.108
Eventually, the term came to be applied to the whole family of doctrines
giving purchasers good title contrary to the rule of nemo dat.109 Today,
the most familiar of those doctrines is found in the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”), which describes in section 2-403 two distinct situations
in which a good faith purchaser can acquire perfect title to an object
despite buying it from a seller with defective title.110 The two doctrines
can be roughly described as sales involving voidable title and sales by an
entrustee.

105
Edward M. Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A Comparative Inquiry, 42 B.U.
L. Rev. 403, 404 (1962).
106
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Artful Good Faith: An Essay on Law, Custom, and
Intermediaries in Art Markets, 62 Duke L.J. 607, 609 (2012) (“In the United States, longstanding rules of property and commercial law embody the nemo dat quod non habet
principle—no one can give what one does not have—with the consequence that a thief cannot
convey good title, not even when stolen property passes through the hands of an intermediary
to a good-faith purchaser.”).
107
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111
Colum. L. Rev. 1332, 1334 (2011).
108
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 269,
277 (2016) (“The market overt doctrine sought to protect purchasers who bought their goods
from sellers in ‘open’ fairs and markets, which formed the principal channel for trade during
the time.”); see also Pease, supra note 103, at 375 (describing the common law rule).
109
See generally Weinberg, supra note 104.
110
U.C.C. § 2-403(1)–(2) (amended 1988); see also Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith
Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15
Ga. L. Rev. 605, 616–17 (1981) (discussing § 2-403).
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The entrustee rule is the easier one to summarize. According to section
2-403(2), “[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives [the entrustee] power to transfer all rights
of the entruster to a buyer in [the] ordinary course of business.”111 Section
2-403(3) goes on to define entrusting as including “any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition
expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and
regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor’s
disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the
criminal law.”112 The entrusting rule can be easily illustrated. Imagine that
Zena owns a car and that her friend Yolanda owns a business selling used
cars. If Zena lends her car to Yolanda for the weekend in order to drive to
a vacation cabin, and Yolanda instead drives the car to the used car lot
and sells it to Xuan during business hours as if the car were part of the
used car lot inventory, Xuan will acquire good title to the car even though
Yolanda never owned the car and was not authorized by Zena to sell it.
The voidable title rules are more complex. The voidable title rule in
section 2-403(1) states that “a person with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”113 Unfortunately,
the rule fails to provide its own definition of “voidable” title, and it does
not clarify its connection to the common law of voidable title. Instead, the
rule goes on to say that
when goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the
purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived
as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange
for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the
transaction was to be a ‘cash sale’, or (d) the delivery was procured
through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.114

This may be interpreted as an elaboration of the traditional common law
categories of voidable title or, perhaps, as the UCC’s own illustration of
the potential types of voidable title.115
111

U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
Id. § 2-403(3).
113
Id. § 2-403(1).
114
Id.
115
For discussion see Gilmore, supra note 110, at 608–20. One classic type of voidable title
that is clearly part of the common law and the UCC rule is a case where someone acquires
defective title through a fraud in inducement such as payment by a bad check. Consider, for
instance, the case of Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry. Nowlin Jewelry, the original owner of a watch,
112
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The doctrine that good faith purchasers can acquire good title from
sellers with defective voidable title is not limited to chattels. The common
law also recognizes a market overt-type rule that grants good title to good
faith purchasers of real property rights when they purchase those rights
from a seller with voidable title.116 If, for instance, Lena acquires a deed
to Blackacre from Katherine, paying with bad checks, and Mary then buys
Blackacre from Lena in good faith, Mary can establish good title to
Blackacre, notwithstanding the voidability of Lena’s title.
However, the most important exception to the ordinary rule of nemo
dat quod non habet in real estate comes from an entirely different source.
Recording acts for real estate transfers establish broad exceptions
permitting purchasers to acquire valid rights to purchased land, even
though the title of the transferor was lacking.117 The classic case covered
by the recording acts is one where the owner of land sells the same land
to multiple purchasers. A straight application of the logic of nemo dat
quod non habet would tell us that the first purchaser would acquire good
title and subsequent purchasers nothing. For instance, if Celeste were to
sell Blackacre to Darlene, and then to Elsa, the logic of the situation would
dictate that Elsa would get nothing because when she “purchased”
Blackacre from Celeste, Darlene already owned it and Celeste had
nothing to sell. The recording acts may dictate a different result. Under
the recording acts, a subsequent purchaser for value of real estate may
establish good title by complying with the recording act’s conditions.118
sold it to Sitton for a check that was ultimately dishonored by the bank due to insufficient
funds. Before Nowlin Jewelry discovered that the check was bad, Sitton sold the watch to
Kotis. When the check was dishonored, Nowlin Jewelry sought to recover the watch on the
grounds that Sitton had never acquired good title due to his fraud, and that Kotis, therefore,
could not acquire good title from Sitton. Kotis, however, claimed that he had acquired good
title to the watch because Sitton’s title, while defective, was “voidable,” and that Kotis
therefore acquired good title as a good faith purchaser for value. The court decided that
Sitton’s title was voidable and that a good faith purchaser could therefore take good title. The
court reasoned that Nowlin Jewelry had intended to sell the watch to Sitton, and was deceived
only about the validity of the payment. Sitton had therefore committed a “fraud in the
inducement,” which is a type of fraud that leads to the defrauding acquiror obtaining voidable
title. Unfortunately for Kotis, the court also determined that Kotis was not a good faith
purchaser, and Nowlin Jewelry prevailed notwithstanding Kotis’s victory on the issue of
voidable title. Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
116
Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 895–99.
117
Jesse Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander, Michael H. Schill & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Property 662 (9th ed. 2018) (“[R]ecording acts have the function of protecting
purchasers for value and lien creditors against prior unrecorded interests.”).
118
Id. at 662–63.
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The conditions required of the subsequent purchaser can be roughly
divided into three categories. In “race” jurisdictions, a subsequent
purchaser can establish good title by recording the purchase before the
prior purchaser.119 In “notice” jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser can
establish good title if she purchases in good faith without notice of the
prior transaction (if the prior purchaser’s transaction is already recorded
at the time of the subsequent purchase, the subsequent purchaser will be
deemed to have “constructive notice” of the prior transaction).120 In “racenotice” jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser can prevail only if she
records first and she purchased without notice of the prior transaction (i.e.,
if she meets the conditions to win in both a race and a notice
jurisdiction).121
The title granted by a recording act has some peculiar features.
Generally, a subsequent purchaser who acquires good title by meeting the
conditions of the recording act can convey that good title to anyone else.
To return to the earlier example, let us suppose that Celeste owns
Blackacre and that she sells Blackacre, first to Darlene, and then to Elsa.
Let us further suppose that Darlene fails to record her purchase, and that
Elsa has no knowledge of the earlier sale to Darlene, and that Elsa
properly records her purchase in the office of the recorder of deeds. The
recording act (whether of the race, notice, or race-notice variety) would
grant Elsa good title, because even though Celeste lacked title to
Blackacre at the time of the sale to Elsa, Elsa bought without notice of the
prior sale, and she recorded her purchase first. But let us imagine that the
chain of transactions continues. Darlene finally records her purchase, and
then Elsa sells Blackacre to Francine. Does Francine have good title? The
answer is yes, due to what is called the “shelter rule.” The shelter rule
clarifies that “one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but who takes an
interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the
latter’s protective status.”122 That is to say, a subsequent purchaser who
acquires good title as a result of the recording act does not merely enjoy
a personal privilege, but actually enjoys the rights of any owner with good
title, including the right to transfer that title to others.123
119

Id. at 682–85 (discussing different types of recording acts).
Id.
121
Id.
122
E.g., Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 853 P.2d 607, 613 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
123
M.J. Higgins, The Transfer of Property Under Illegal Transactions, 25 Modern L. Rev.
149, 149 (1969). While the shelter rule provides wide protection for the good faith purchaser,
120
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Like the rules of market overt, our proposal seeks to make fair use
rights marketable, enabling fair use findings to “shelter” follow-on users.
As in the case of the market overt, it is not necessary for all subsequent
uses to be sheltered by the initial fair use finding. However, without a
fairly broad shelter rule for fair uses, fair uses could not rightly be
described as marketable.
III. A SECOND CONCEPTION OF FAIR USE
In this Part, we introduce our proposal to transform fair use rights into
marketable, durable use rights. The gist of our proposal is to introduce a
novel conception of fair use alongside the existing type of fair use. Our
new kind of fair use is modelled as a property defense that shelters all
subsequent users of the work that won a fair use status. In our vision, this
new conception would complement, not replace, the existing fair use
defense. We also explain how judges would choose between the two
conceptions of fair use in individual cases. We show that our proposed
addition would improve the workings of our copyright system. After
presenting our proposal, we show that our proposal to reform fair use law
is consistent with the general trend in copyright law to create rights for
the creators of follow-on works in order to enhance works’ marketability.
A. A Proposal for Reforming Fair Use Law
Our reform proposal consists of three interlocking steps. First, we
introduce a new conception of fair use, under which the doctrine would
constitute an in rem property remedy. This new conception is intended
not to supplant existing fair use doctrine but, rather, to complement it. The
vision we present below consists of two conceptions of fair use: the in
that protection is not prophylactic. One standard exception to the shelter rule is called the
“original owner exception.” It provides that “when a good faith purchaser obtains the property
from a grantor who had notice of an outstanding interest in the property, the shelter rule does
not apply if the property is reconveyed to the grantor.” Strekal v. Espe, 114 P.3d 67, 74 (Colo.
App. 2004). To illustrate this, let us return to our prior example in which Celeste conveys
Blackacre first to Darlene and then to Elsa, and Elsa acquires good title due to the recording
act. If Elsa sells Blackacre to the innocent Francine, Francine will enjoy the benefit of the
shelter rule, and she too will be considered the owner of Blackacre with good title. If, however,
Elsa sells Blackacre to Celeste, Celeste will not be able to take advantage of the shelter
provided by Elsa’s recorded good faith purchase, and she will not be able to reacquire title
from Elsa. A second exception to the shelter rule is when the benefiting party from the
recording act then conveys to a new purchaser “who is guilty of violating a trust or duty with
respect to the property.” Id. at 74.
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personam, familiar form and a new in rem fair use exception. This would
lead to a two-option fair use menu. Second, we give judges the ability, in
appropriate cases, to shelter not only the particular defendant before them
but also all subsequent legitimate users of the defendant’s work. Judges
could do this by ruling in the particular case that the fair use finding is in
rem and marketable. Third, to ensure clarity, we propose two default rules
that determine which of the two conceptions of fair use would apply if the
court failed to choose explicitly between the competing conceptions of
fair use.
As we explained, extant fair use is an in personam defense that applies
on a per use basis. Our first innovation is to introduce a different
conception of fair use that is fashioned as a property defense. Under our
proposed in rem conception, fair use would take on the character of an
easement on a copyrighted work. Once a certain use had been declared
fair by a court, the classification would carry over to other users who want
to make use of the same expression. In other words, a court’s finding of
fair use would have the same effect as market overt rules in property: it
would allow defendants whose use was ruled fair by a court to give use
rights free of claims by prior authors whose content was incorporated into
the work. Fair use, in other words, would have sheltering power.
If the Supreme Court were to have incorporated this conception of fair
use in finding that Google’s use of Oracle’s APIs was fair, the benefit of
the ruling would inure not only to Google but also to all the developers of
all the applications that run on Android. Since they operated with
Google’s blessing and clearly had permission from Google to offer their
content to Android users, they too would be sheltered from potential
lawsuits from Oracle.
It should be emphasized that this proposed property conception of fair
use is not meant to replace the traditional fair use defense. Rather, it is
designed to complement it. Hence, the introduction of the property
version of fair use would result in a simple legal menu with two fair use
conceptions: (a) the traditional in personam fair use defense that avails
only the specific individual defendant and would cover only the particular
use she has made of the plaintiff’s work and (b) the property version of
fair use that protects not only the defendant herself but all subsequent
users who received permission from her to use the work.
The introduction of a fair use menu would require judges to choose
among three options in fair use cases (as opposed to the two familiar
options they choose from today). Judges could deny fair use altogether,
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find traditional fair use, or grant the property version of fair use.
Importantly, the criteria for making the decision would remain the same.
We do not propose changing the traditional fair use test enshrined in
section 107 of the Copyright Act. Hence, judges will not have to retrain
themselves. Substantively, they would be asked to perform the same
familiar task they have always performed. Only the consequences would
change. The introduction of the property version of fair use would enable
judges to redefine the ramifications of a fair use ruling by extending their
decision to a much larger group of users.
Judges would have the power to grant the expansive property version
of fair use, irrespective of the defendant’s pleadings. In fact, defendants
would not be required to specify which of the two fair use varieties they
argue. As today, they would simply argue fair use. The reason is simple:
if defendants were forced to choose between the two options and their
choice would bind the court, defendants would likely prefer to err on the
side of safety and raise the traditional fair use defense. Hence, it should
be the judge, not the defendant, who gets to decide which of the two
conceptions of fair use to adopt.
Since our proposal does not affect the ability of judges to find
traditional fair use, it should not raise any concern that it would adversely
affect the willingness of judges to find fair use. Judges who were wary of
ruling in favor of an in rem fair use could reject that option and stick with
the traditional fair use finding. Judges, in other words, could always take
the safe and conservative approach.
The third part of our proposal is to establish a set of default rules that
would determine which of the two versions of fair use would obtain where
judges fail to address this point. Where judges remain silent (accidentally
or deliberately) as to whether they adopted the in personam or in rem
version of fair use, we propose that the determination be made in
accordance with the following guidelines. In cases in which the alleged
infringement consists of incorporating copyrighted content into a new
work, as in the case of the Android operating system or the “Pretty
Woman” song, the property version of fair use should be the legal default.
This is because, in such cases, the marketability of the putatively
infringing derivative work is a paramount concern and a broad fair use
finding would benefit all future users of this work. In all other cases, the
traditional, in personam conception of fair use would constitute the
default setting. For example, if a college professor plays a short video to
her students and gets sued by the copyright owner, the traditional in
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personam version of fair use should apply. Here it is important to grant
protection to the professor on a personal, per use basis. There is no need
to extend protection beyond her. Marketability is not a paramount
concern, and the traditional version of fair use therefore suffices.
To illustrate, consider the famous case of Sony Corporation of America
v. Universal City Studios.124 In that case, Sony, the manufacturer of the
Betamax video cassette recorder, argued that home users of the recorder
could lawfully record over-the-air television programs in order to watch
them later. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that such copying for the
purpose of “time-shifting” fell within the boundaries of fair use.125 In
large part, the Court adopted the analysis of the trial court, which viewed
the noncommercial personal use of the recordings as central to the finding
of fair use.126 In cases where the finding of fair use is grounded primarily
or solely in the fact that the work is for personal use, there is little utility
to a potential fair use easement. In such cases, even where the judges fail
to specify what type of fair use they prefer, it should be obvious that the
fair use ruling is in personam.
B. Our Proposal Compared to Collateral Estoppel
At this point, some readers may wonder if our proposal is not made
superfluous by the non-mutual collateral estoppel doctrine. As we will
explain, the answer is no. Non-mutual collateral estoppel has branched
out of its more familiar cousin, mutual collateral estoppel. Both doctrines
deal with issue preclusion, a subset of res judicata.127 They exist to
economize judicial resources.128 The basic idea is “that once a person has
been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a particular issue, that
person may not be permitted to do so again.”129 Historically, issue
preclusion arose only between the same litigants.130 Thus, the doctrine
was called mutual collateral estoppel. Over time, the mutuality
124

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 454–55 (“[H]ome time-shifting is fair use.”).
126
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432–33 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
127
See Jarosz v. Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482, 487 n.3 (Mass. 2002) (dividing res judicata law
into issue preclusion and claim preclusion).
128
See Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (N.Y. 1979)
(explaining that issue preclusion is necessary “to conserve judicial resources by discouraging
redundant litigation”).
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, The Story of Parklane: The “Litigation Crisis” and the
Efficiency Imperative, in Civil Procedure Stories 387, 390–91 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
125

COPYRIGHT © 2021 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1288

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 107:1255

requirement has been eroded, primarily out of fear of inconsistent rulings
by different courts, and non-mutual collateral estoppel was born.
The potential validity of non-mutual collateral estoppel was first
recognized for defensive purposes by the California Supreme Court in
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association.131 In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation,132 a patent infringement case, the U.S. Supreme Court gave
its approval to the use of defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. In
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, the respondent, whose patent was ruled
invalid in prior litigation, tried to assert the same patent against a different
corporation. The Court ruled that collateral estoppel applied, even though
different parties were in court, and the patent claim was therefore
barred.133 Subsequently, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,134 the Court
also recognized the possibility of using non-mutual collateral estoppel
offensively, granting trial courts “broad discretion to determine when it
should be applied.”135 In addition to its place in federal law, non-mutual
collateral estoppel doctrine has been adopted in a majority of states,
although a sizeable minority continues to insist on mutuality.136
The doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel has been criticized by
commentators on both fairness and efficiency grounds.137 Without wading
into this debate, our aim is to explain why the doctrine of non-mutual
collateral estoppel falls short of the in rem fair use conception we propose
in this Article. Most importantly, unlike validity determinations, whose
applicability is universal (a copyright or a patent is either valid or not),
fair use determinations are invariably context-specific. For this reason,
non-mutual collateral estoppel will rarely, if ever, come into play in fair
use cases. Differences in party identity and even minor differences in use
ensure that it is nearly impossible for a fair use issue to arise in precisely
the same manner in proceedings between different parties, even over the
same work or set of works.
131

122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal. 1942).
402 U.S. 313, 313, 350 (1971).
133
Id. at 347, 350; see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property
Defenses, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1483, 1512 (2013) (classifying patent invalidation as a general
in rem defense).
134
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
135
Id. at 331.
136
Steven P. Nonkes, Reducing the Unfair Effects of Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Through
Damages Limits, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1459, 1467–68 (2009).
137
For review, see id. at 1469–75.
132
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Our in rem fair use conception, by contrast, is tailored to provide
substantive, as opposed to procedural, shelter. It does not require
downstream users to show that their use is exactly the same as that of a
previous fair user, and it is unlikely that the uses will ever be precisely
identical. The easement analogy is illuminating here too. An in rem fair
use ruling, similar to an easement, runs with the asset to all future users.
A court that decides to award an in rem fair use is presumed to have taken
into account the possibility that follow-on users might use the content in
different ways and found that appropriate. As we emphasize throughout
this Article, the in rem conception is not applicable to all cases and, where
it is inapplicable, a court can select the standard in personam fair use or
deny fair use altogether. But once it adopts the conception we propose, all
future users of the specific content will be sheltered.
Finally, we should note that our proposal obviates the need to litigate.
An in rem fair use ruling would avail all future users, giving them peace
of mind and a true sense of security. Non-mutual collateral estoppel
cannot achieve this. It should be borne in mind that the cost of litigation
and the uncertainty that accompanies it often combine to stifle individual
creativity and limit the use of existing copyrighted content.
C. The Advantages of Our Proposal
Our proposal offers three potential advantages relative to the current
regime of fair use. First, the introduction of that in rem property version
of fair use would increase certainty with respect to the use of derivative
works that fairly incorporate preexisting copyrighted content. As we
explained, the adoption of our proposal would allow judges in appropriate
fair use cases to shelter other potential users by allowing them to engage
in the same use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach would
permit tailoring remedies to the specific circumstances of fair use cases.
Currently, all fair use cases are treated in the same manner. Extant
doctrine allows judges to take account of societal concerns, but at the end
of the day, the ruling affects only the defendant. The proposed property
version of fair use would allow judges to take account of the potential for
future uses of the fair use work, without being constrained to a single
conception. Under our proposal, judges would have the ability to consider
the implications of fair use claims for other users and fashion their rulings
accordingly. Moreover, the default settings of fair use we proposed would
ensure clarity about the particular meaning of fair use rulings in those
cases where the judge chooses not to specify which version to apply.
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Second, our proposal would have the salutary effect of lowering
transaction and litigation costs for follow-on creators.138 Current fair use
doctrine forces creators of expressive works that rely on prior derivative
works to obtain licenses from both the original owner and the fair user, or
plead their own fair use case anew in court. Both options are costly. To a
large degree, our proposal alleviates this burden. In cases in which judges
would find a property fair use, the ruling would economize on transaction
costs for follow-on users and conserve judicial resources for courts. This
is because, unlike existing fair use rulings, in rem fair uses would clear
the path for all subsequent users of the work involved in the litigation.
To illustrate, imagine that the Supreme Court had incorporated our
proposal in Google v. Oracle and had determined that Google was entitled
to a finding of property fair use. Such a ruling would shelter not only all
the companies that created Android-enabled applications but also all
future companies that produce such applications as well. This, in turn,
would free up considerable resources for the relevant parties.
Third, and finally, our proposal would enhance the use of copyrighted
content. The sheltering principle would enable multiple downstream users
to create adaptations of derivative works that were found by courts to
make fair uses of older works. Any finding by a court of an in rem fair
use would permit downstream users to utilize the fairly used content
without worrying about being exposed to legal liability for incorporating
it into a new work. The addition of the property conception of fair use will
open up new creative avenues for follow-on creators and users and, in the
aggregate, increase the liberties that the public at large would have with
respect to copyrighted content. Needless to say, these options would arise
when a court deems them appropriate. As should be clear, the availability
of the broad fair use conception is born out of judicial determination or
implicit judicial approval in appropriate cases. In all other cases, the
familiar view of fair use would apply.
IV. EXTANT COPYRIGHT LAW AND MARKETABILITY
Having proposed our suggested reform of fair use law, we now turn to
show how it is consistent with the general trend in copyright law.
As we have noted,139 fair uses often involve the creation of a follow-on
work to an already copyrighted original work. Even when the use is fair,
138
139

For discussion of transaction and litigation costs, see supra Section I.B.
Supra Part I.
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and the creation of the follow-on work lawful, copyright ownership in the
original persists undisturbed, including in those pieces of the original
incorporated in the follow-on work. In the absence of a mechanism like
our proposal, this doctrinal feature of copyright sets up future clashes
between the rights of the creator of the follow-on work (the fair user) and
the rights of the owner of the original work. Every use of the follow-on
work (such as a public performance) necessarily involves a use of the
original work, and thus, absent our proposal, the follow-on work can
never be used without a license from the owner of the original work.
Fair uses are not the only instances in which copyright law has had to
cope with the fallout of the lawful creation of a follow-on work that
incorporates parts of an original work owned by someone else. Indeed,
the world of copyright is replete with instances of follow-on works being
created lawfully with permission from the owner at the time, only to have
ownership of the original work reassigned to someone else who no longer
permits use of the derivative work. Fortunately, as we shall see, copyright
law has created a number of compromise solutions where owners of an
original deny permission to the owner of an already existing follow-on
work. These solutions ensure some measure of durability and
marketability of rights in a follow-on work after the reassignment of
ownership. These compromise solutions share many features with our
proposed reform of fair use law.140
Copyright’s termination rights, for instance, give former owners of
copyrights the ability, in some cases, to terminate a prior transfer of
ownership and thereby to recover ownership of a copyright after many
years in which the rights had belonged to the transferee.141 In some cases,
the former transferee/owner had properly authorized the creation of a
derivative work, but the post-termination owner (the original owner) no
longer wishes to license the use of the derivative work. Without some
arrangement to ensure the durability and marketability of rights in the
now-problematic derivative work, use of the derivative work will depend
on the decision of the original owner. That original owner could veto all
uses of the derivative work and essentially render it worthless.

140
For a different proposed approach to follow-on works, as part of a comprehensive
approach to copyright improvements, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 992 (1997).
141
See infra Section IV.B.
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Fortunately, the law of copyright termination provides for the continued
exploitation of derivative works following termination.142
In the remainder of this Part, we examine the law of termination rights
and other situations in which copyright law has confronted potential
clashes between the rights of owners of a copyright in a work and the
rights of the owner of a follow-on work. We show that, in such situations,
Congress and the courts have employed doctrinal mechanisms similar to
our proposed version of fair use to preserve and enhance the marketability
of expressive content and prevent copyright holders from blocking the use
of works that rely on preexisting content. Specifically, in the remainder
of this Part, we discuss three instances that illustrate this dynamic:
renewals of copyrights, termination of copyrights, and restoration of
copyright protection. In each case, we illustrate the potential problem of
durability and marketability and look at the solution already incorporated
in copyright law.
A. Renewals
Our first example concerns renewal rights. Since the inception of legal
copyright protection,143 copyrights have been limited in time; no one
owns a perpetual copyright in a work of authorship. Today, in most cases,
copyrights persist for seventy years after the death of the author.144 This
unitary term of protection is an innovation of the 1976 Copyright Act.145
Historically, the copyright protection term was not unitary. Authors
would receive an initial term of protection (fourteen years under the
earliest copyright statutes,146 but twenty-eight years under the 1909
Copyright Act)147 and a right to renew that protection for a second
“renewal term” of equal length (another twenty-eight years under the
1909 Act).148 While the first protection period was granted to authors
142

See id.
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., C. 19 (Eng.) (establishing what is commonly understood
to be the first legal copyright protection).
144
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
145
Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years”
Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldered v. Ashcroft,
36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 437, 437–48 (2002) (discussing the incentive effects of the move to a
single fixed term in the 1976 Copyright Act).
146
See id. at 450 n.39 (surveying the history of copyright protection terms under various
copyright acts).
147
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
148
Id.
143
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automatically, the second term was not; authors had to obtain it by
following the procedure for renewing their rights.149 When the 1976
Copyright Act introduced unitary terms, it did not retroactively unify the
terms of all copyrights then in existence. Unitary terms applied under the
1976 Act prospectively only; copyrights created on or after the Act’s
effective date of January 1, 1978 enjoyed a unitary term.150 Copyrights
created earlier than that continued to have bifurcated terms—an original
term for twenty-eight years and a longer renewal term (the 1976 Act
extended the renewal term to forty-seven years, and later legislation
extended it again to sixty-seven years).151 This meant that, even after
passage of the 1976 Act, owners would have to file their renewal papers
on time, and in the proper format, in order to enjoy the full potential term
of protection for works created in the decades before the effective date of
the 1976 Act. In 1992, Congress relaxed this burden by making renewal
automatic.152 This meant that works created and published with notice
between the years of 1964 and 1977 would get the full seventy-five (and
later ninety-five) years of protection, but that protection would be divided
between a twenty-eight-year original term and an automatically received
forty-seven (later sixty-seven) year renewal term.153
From the outset, courts viewed ownership of the renewal right as
separate from ownership of the copyright in the initial term of
protection.154 This was not a far-fetched interpretation. Section 24 of the
1909 Act, for example, specified that “[t]he copyright secured by this title
shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication”
before separately establishing that
the author of [a copyrighted] work, if still living, or [the successor
designated by law] shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when
application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the

149

Id.
See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.01 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2021) (reviewing the history of the copyright terms).
151
Id. § 9.05.
152
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
153
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 9.05.
154
See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951)
(holding the renewal right “creates a new estate, and the few cases which have dealt with the
subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the
original copyright”).
150
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copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the
expiration of the original term of copyright.155

Similar treatment could be found in earlier copyright acts.156
The bifurcation of copyright into two separate sets of rights—one
associated with the initial term, and the second associated with the
potential renewal term—could be decisive in copyright disputes. If, for
instance, Jane Doe wrote a short story, and then sold rights in the story to
BigBook Publishing House, courts would view Bigbook as the owner of
the first twenty-eight-year term of copyright protection in the short story,
but not necessarily as the owner of the renewal right. Unless there were
some reasons to read the license otherwise, it would be Doe who retained
the renewal right. If Doe properly filed renewal forms in the twentyeighth year of copyright protection, the short story would then enjoy an
additional twenty-eight years of copyright protection, and Doe would be
the owner of the copyright during that renewal term.
In the landmark 1943 case of Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark &
Sons, the Supreme Court determined that authors could transfer renewal
terms before they were secured.157 Thus, a single transfer of rights could
cover both the initial term and the renewal period.158 In our example, Jane
Doe could sell to BigBook Publishing House her renewal term together
with the original term of copyright protection if she so desired. However,
courts placed some limits on the transfer of renewal terms. The courts
noted that the statute did not unambiguously give renewal terms to the
author;159 the 1909 statute granted the renewal term to the author “if still
living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be
not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living,
then the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin.”160
Courts determined that if the author died before securing the renewal term
the attempted transfer of the renewal term would be ineffective because
the author never had any rights to give; instead, the rights to the renewal
155

Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
See Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23,
24 (1955) (outlining the history of copyright renewal and ownership rights in the common
law).
157
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 659 (1943).
158
Id.
159
See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“The statute is hardly
unambiguous, however, and presents problems of interpretation not solved by literal
application of words as they are ‘normally’ used.”).
160
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
156
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term would pass to the statutory designees who would be free to ignore
the transfer.161
This judicial scheme provided the background for the dilemma
addressed by the Second Circuit in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.162 The
1977 case concerned the George Fitzmaurice film, The Son of the Sheik
(starring Rudolf Valentino), which had been based on an earlier novel,
The Sons of the Sheik.163 The novel had been written by Edith Maude Hull,
who had sold the motion picture rights to Joseph Moskowitz.164 On the
basis of that sale, a film was made, and the film copyright was
subsequently sold several times, ending up in the hands of Killiam
Shows.165 Unfortunately, Hull (the author of the novel) died too early to
renew her copyright, and the renewal right ended up with her daughter,
Cecil Winstanley Hull, who ended up selling all rights in the novel to
Rohauer.166 Thus, Rohauer held the copyright in the novel during the
renewal period, while Killiam Shows owned the copyright in the film.
Rohauer sought to block a television broadcast of the film. There was no
question that the film had been lawfully made and that Killiam Shows
lawfully owned the copyright in the film. However, there was also little
doubt that the film incorporated large copyrighted parts of the novel (such
as its plot).167 Rohauer therefore argued that his ownership of the
copyright in the novel was sufficient to prevent broadcast of the film.168
The court disagreed. Emphasizing that the filmmaker had invested far
more in creating the work than an owner of a renewal right who acquired
it solely by surviving the original author of the novel, the court found that
where a copyright had been established in a derivative work lawfully
created by license during the original term, the invalidity of the license in
the renewal term due to the untimely demise of the original author could
not prevent continued exploitation of the derivative work.169
Acknowledging that its finding did not precisely match the text of the
statute, the court claimed that the statute’s ambiguity, together with
161
See Jeffrey M. Lowy, When Does the Renewal Term Vest: Before and After the
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, 13 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 437, 438–40 (1993).
162
551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977).
163
Id. at 486.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 487.
169
Id. at 492–94.
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compelling policy reasons, pointed towards viewing the creation of the
derivative work as the creation of a broad property right that could
override the rights of the owner of the renewal term.170 As Nimmer
unhappily summarized what he called the “new property right theory” at
the heart of the case,
once a derivative [or collective] work is created pursuant to a valid
license to use the underlying material, a new property right springs into
existence with respect to the entire derivative work, so that even if the
license is thereafter terminated, the proprietor of the derivative work
may nevertheless continue to use the material from the underlying work
as contained in the derivative [or collective] work.171

The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s Rohauer ruling in
the 1990 case Stewart v. Abend.172 Stewart v. Abend involved the fate of
the famous 1954 Alfred Hitchcock movie Rear Window, starring Jimmy
Stewart. The movie was based on a 1942 short story by Cornell Woolrich,
entitled It Had to Be a Murder.173 Woolrich had sold motion picture rights
to the short story for both the original and renewal terms to BG De Sylva
Productions;174 eventually the rights were purchased from De Sylva’s
successors in interest by Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart’s
company, Patron.175 Unfortunately, Woolrich died in 1968 without
getting the opportunity to renew the copyright. Woolrich’s transfer of the
renewal term was thus ineffective (because Woolrich had never owned
it), and ownership of the renewal term fell to the executor of the estate
and, ultimately, to Sheldon Abend.176 The movie Rear Window came out
in 1954, during the initial term of copyright, and therefore was solidly
within the terms of Hitchcock and Stewart’s right to create and exploit the
derivative work during the copyright’s initial period of protection (1942
to 1970). However, in 1971, ABC television broadcast Rear Window on
the basis of a license from Stewart and Hitchcock.177 Abend objected.
According to Abend, while Stewart and Hitchcock rightly owned the
copyright in Rear Window, there were plot elements of the movie that
170

Id.
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 3.07.
172
495 U.S. 207 (1990).
173
Id. at 211–12.
174
Id. at 212.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
171
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came from the short story, and those elements were not part of the Rear
Window copyright but, rather, part of the short story copyright.178 Abend
claimed that as the owner of the copyright in the short story during the
renewal term, he had the right to prevent any broadcasting of the plot
elements in any form, including in the form of a legitimately created
derivative work.179
Rejecting the reasoning of Rohauer, the Supreme Court sided with
Abend. The Court found that nothing in the language of the Copyright
Act granted any rights to the owners of follow-on works to continue using
material within the copyright of the original work without permission.180
The Court brushed aside policy concerns, saying “[t]hese arguments are
better addressed by Congress than the courts.”181
Congress did not take long. Only two years after the Court’s ruling in
Stewart v. Abend, Congress enacted the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992,
which provides in relevant part that
If an application to register a claim to the renewed and extended term
of copyright in a work is not made within 1 year before the expiration
of the original term of copyright in a work, or if the claim pursuant to
such application is not registered, then a derivative work prepared under
authority of a grant of a transfer or license of the copyright that is made
before the expiration of the original term of copyright may continue to
be used under the terms of the grant during the renewed and extended
term of copyright without infringing the copyright, except that such use
does not extend to the preparation during such renewed and extended
term of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work
covered by such grant.182

This turgid provision, appearing today in section 304(a)(4)(A) of the
Copyright Act, partially reverses the ruling in Stewart v. Abend and
partially restores the rule of Rohauer v. Killian.183 However, the reversal
only applies in a narrow set of cases—in cases where the owner of the
renewal term failed to file the required forms and instead relied upon the
Copyright Act’s automatic renewal for works published between the
178

Id.
Id. at 212–14.
180
Id. at 223–24.
181
Id. at 228.
182
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (codified as
amended 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4)(A)).
183
17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(4)(A).
179
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years of 1964 and 1977.184 In that narrow set of cases, anyone who made
a properly licensed derivative work during the original term of protection
could continue to use it during the renewal term as if the grant for the
original term remained in force throughout the renewal term.185 In all
other cases, the ruling in Stewart v. Abend continues to apply.186
Congress’s decision to overturn the Supreme Court ruling in Stewart v.
Abend in part and to allow for the continued marketability, use, and
enjoyment of preexisting derivative works is consistent with the logic of
our proposal. Our proposal, like Congress’s corrective legislation, aims
to nurture downstream markets by clearing away unnecessary and
burdensome transaction and coordination costs.
B. Terminations
A related instance in which copyright law has incorporated protections
for the durability and marketability of follow-on works can be found in
the law of terminations.
As we noted, the 1976 Copyright Act replaced the two-term copyright
protection of previous versions of the copyright act with a unitary term.187
In doing so, the 1976 Copyright Act ensured that legal difficulties
associated with renewal terms would gradually disappear, since
copyrighted works created after the effective date of January 1, 1978
would not require renewal. (Old works continued to have a renewal term,
but renewal became automatic.)188 This reform ought to have greatly
simplified questions of ownership. It did not.
While phasing out the renewal term, Congress created a new
mechanism for undoing copyright transfers. The Copyright Act now
allows authors (or their designated successors) to terminate most transfers
and to regain the copyright after a certain period of time.189 The
termination rules are exceptionally complex, requiring notice to be served
upon transferees two to ten years before the precise date of termination,
which must fall within a statutorily defined five-year window. The statute
creates six different ways to calculate the five-year window, depending
184

See Lowy, supra note 161, at 468–69 (“The main purpose of the Copyright Renewal Act
of 1992 is to provide a system of automatic renewal of copyrights.”).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 473.
187
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
188
Lowy, supra note 161, at 471–72.
189
17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
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on the date of the transfer, whether the work was published, and whether
the transfer had previously been eligible for termination.190
Generally, the aim of the scheme is described as openly paternalistic—
to give authors the opportunity to resell copyrights after having already
sold them a first time.191 On this view, authors benefit by being forced to
sell fewer rights in an initial transaction so they can then sell the
remaining rights in a later transaction, after the market for the copyrighted
work has fully developed (or disappeared).192 A different explanation for
the termination rules focuses on the windfall resulting from the extended
terms that were adopted after the reform of copyright rules.193 Together,
the 1976 Act and the later Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 retroactively extended the duration of copyright rights by as much
as thirty-seven years.194 These extensions bestowed a windfall on the
owners of valuable copyrights. Termination rights permit authors to seize
a part or all of the windfall from transferees, in a situation where neither
anticipated the future windfall at the time of the initial transfer.
As with the ownership rules of renewal terms, termination rights create
the potential for a clash between owners of rights in the original work,
and owners of rights in a lawfully created follow-on work. It is possible,
for example, for a comic book author to sell to a movie studio all motion
picture rights and then, many years later, for the author to terminate the
sale and recover all the previously transferred rights in the comic book.195
If, in the meantime, the movie studio had made several movies on the
basis of the rights it had purchased, the studio would still own copyright
in the film, but it would be unable to use the films because the films would

190

Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c)–(d).
See, e.g., Kristelia A. García and Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s
Term, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 351 (2019) (noting that “[l]ike termination rights, rights reversion gives
the creator a second bite of the apple by reversing an artist’s original transfer of copyright
ownership, thereby transferring ownership over a work’s copyright back from an intermediary
to the original artist”).
192
Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable”
Right to Terminate, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1329, at 1345–46 (2010).
193
See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 11.02[A][3].
194
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
195
Cf. Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (concerning
attempted termination by the children of comic book artist Jack Kirby of transfer to Marvel of
rights in characters such as Spider-Man, the Fantastic Four, and the X-Men); Siegel v. Warner
Bros. Ent. Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (concerning attempted
termination by Superman creators Jerry Siegel and Joe Shuster of transfer of rights to
Superman).
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naturally incorporate characters, plot lines, and even dialogue from the
comic books.
Congress, however, more adroitly navigated this potential clash of
interests than it did with respect to conflicts over renewal terms. Section
304(c)(6)(A) of the Copyright Act provides that
[a] derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation
after the termination of other derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.196

The result of this provision is that if the lawfully created follow-on work
is a derivative work, as the term is defined by the copyright, the owner of
the follow-on work should prevail in a clash with the owner of the original
rights. The owner of the follow-on work, and other lawful licensees of the
follow-on work, will be able to continue using the work, so long as they
abide by the terms of the pre-termination grant. This arrangement shares
the logic of our proposal: to facilitate the use of legitimately created
follow-on works.
C. Restored Copyright
Problems associated with transitory personal rights have also arisen is
in cases of “restored copyrights.” Restored copyrights are the result of a
pair of laws adopted by Congress as part of the United States’ accession
to the Berne Convention: the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988197 (effective date March 1, 1989), in which the United States joined
the Berne Convention, and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of
1994198 (effective date January 1, 1995), in which the United States
amended its copyright law in various ways to fall into line with legal
standards demanded by international trade treaties. The new laws granted
retroactive copyright protection to foreign works, which had enjoyed
copyright protection in other countries but were not protected in the
United States due to their failure to abide by legal formalities that were
once part of the law but are no longer—such as the requirement to place

196

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A).
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
198
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994).
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proper copyright notice on every published copy.199 The laws created a
category of “restored copyrights”—copyrights in works that had spent
years or decades in the public domain in the United States but, as of
January 1, 1996, found themselves “restored” to the hands of the original
author.200
To understand how restored copyrights work, consider the following
example. Alexis Author, a resident of London, wrote and published a
novel in 1955 called Good England. In 1958, Alexis Author authorized
American Publishers, Inc. to sell copies of the novel in the United States;
unfortunately, American Publishers failed to include the copyright notice
in each copy required by U.S. law at the time.201 Publication without
notice in 1958 thus stripped the novel of any copyright protection in the
United States even though the novel continued to enjoy copyright
protection in Britain. Section 104A of the Copyright Act (as rewritten by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994)202 automatically restored
Alexis Author’s rights to Good England in the United States as of January
1, 1996; Alexis’s U.S. rights in her novel will therefore remain in force
for ninety-five years, through 2053.
Restored copyrights have the potential to pose problems for follow-on
works created during the period where the work lacked copyright
protection. Consider what would happen if, in the above example
involving Alexis Author’s British novel, the American company Movie
Studios, Inc. decided to make a film version of Good England in 1960,
during the period when the novel Good England was in the public domain
in the United States. Obviously, in 1960, Movie Studios would not need
any sort of license to create its movie, since the novel was in the public
domain at the time. However, after January 1, 1996, any public showing
of the movie would necessarily involve a public performance of those
parts of the novel incorporated in the film. As in the cases of derivative
works in the renewal term, or after termination, the film would be a
follow-on work that had been lawfully created but could no longer be
lawfully used.
In the case of restored copyrights, the problem did not escape the notice
of Congress. Section 104A specifically addresses the case of “reliance
199

Tung Yin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights: A Constitutional Analysis of Section 514 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 383, 384 (1997).
200
See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 9A.04[A][1][a].
201
Id. §§ 7.02–7.03.
202
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
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parties”—parties who relied on the public domain status of the work prior
to the restoration of copyright to engage in actions that would be
copyright infringements had the works been protected, and who continued
to engage in such actions after restoration of the copyright.203 The statute
gives reliance parties certain rights to continue using the work in ways
that would otherwise be seen as infringements: a statutory license to
continue using derivative works204 and a grace period for other uses.205
The grace period lasts one year, but the onset of the period is not the
date of copyright restoration. Rather, the grace period begins when the
reliance party receives notice (or is constructively put on notice) that the
restored copyright owner intends to enforce her rights.206 During the oneyear grace period, the reliance party can continue to use the work in ways
that would be considered infringing, including distributing, performing,
and displaying the work, and authorizing others to do the same.207
Derivative works based upon a work with restored copyright enjoy
even more rights. As long as the derivative work was created a sufficient
time before restoration (before the effective date of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act or, in certain cases, before the joining of the Berne
Convention and other treaties by the foreign country source of the restored
work), reliance parties can continue using the derivative work
indefinitely, without permission of the owner of the restored copyright.208
The statute simply requires that the reliance party pay compensation to
the owner of the restored copyright. If the parties cannot agree on
compensation, courts are instructed to set a rate that reflects “any harm to
the actual or potential market for or value of the restored work from the
reliance party’s continued exploitation of the work, as well as
compensation for the relative contributions of expression of the author of
the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work.”209

203

Id.
Id. § 104A(d)(3)(A) (“[A] reliance party may continue to exploit that derivative work for
the duration of the restored copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the restored
copyright reasonable compensation for conduct which would be subject to a remedy for
infringement . . . .”).
205
Id. § 104A(d)(2)(B) (outlining a twelve-month grace period for reliance parties
beginning on the date notice is given of intent to restore a copyright).
206
Id.
207
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)(B).
208
Id. § 104A(d)(3).
209
Id.
204
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As our discussion demonstrates, in its approach to copyright
restoration, Congress aimed to ensure the continued use of derivative
works that were based on foreign works that were unprotected at that time.
The same concern is the driving force behind our proposal to create a
property version of fair use.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we call for a radical transformation in the fair use
doctrine—not in determining when uses are “fair” but, rather, in
delineating the scope of the protection afforded by fair use findings.
Today, fair use is personal and individualized. A fair use ruling helps only
the individual defendant who was sued for copyright infringement and
protects only the challenged use or uses by that defendant. Her victory
does not carry over to others who receive permission to use her work that
incorporates the fair use. We call for the introduction of a new fair use
conception modelled as a property incident. The property version of fair
use would provide immunity to any third party who uses derivative works
that fairly incorporate copyrighted content with permission from the fair
user. Fair use rulings would benefit all those that lawfully use, perform,
distribute, and adapt follow-on works in which copyrighted content is
fairly embedded (i.e., incorporated by right of fair use). Downstream
users of the follow-on work would no longer need to engage in any
bargaining with the owner of the original source work; it would suffice
for them to obtain a license from the fair user who created the follow-on
work.
Implementation of our proposal would give courts broad discretion to
decide which fair use, if any, to recognize in cases brought before them.
To assist courts, we propose two default rules that would apply when a
court fails to specify which of the two fair use conceptions it has selected.
In cases involving derivative works that incorporate preexisting copyright
content, the property version of fair use should apply and run to
subsequent users of the derivative work. In other cases, the traditional in
personam version should govern. Courts would retain the discretion to
diverge from the default rules by, for example, creating an in personam
fair use for a derivative work. The reform we propose would benefit not
only users but also creators who fairly rely on preexisting materials, as it
would dramatically enhance the marketability, and thus the value, of their
works. The proposal is fully consistent with the general trend in copyright
law to protect marketability even at the expense of the veto power of the
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original work owner. At the same time, our remedy respects the judicial
autonomy that has traditionally characterized fair use rulings.
Copyright law is not exclusively concerned with the production of
original expressive content; it also seeks to promote the use of works after
they have been created. One of the central purposes of the fair use doctrine
is to ensure such future use. Without reform, the fair use doctrine cannot
afford adequate protection to user interests. We submit that our proposed
reform would follow in the footsteps of similar accommodations already
made by copyright law to protect the rights and interests of follow-on
users and creators. An in rem conception of fair use that exists alongside
the traditional in personam fair use privilege can bring about an improved
balance in copyright law between the rights of creators and those of
follow-on users.

